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U.S. Supply Chains Grapple Cost Pressures and Uncertainty

Heading into the second half of 2026 shippers face, a politically charged USMCA review, an early tightening on the trans‑Pacific, and war‑driven fuel costs pushing up inland transport prices across North America. 

Together, they are rewriting the assumptions many companies use for peak‑season planning, pricing and inland network design.

USMCA stability at stake for North American production

The United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) reaches its first scheduled “joint review” on 1 July 2026, six years after it took effect. The three governments must decide whether to confirm the deal through 2042, seek adjustments, or signal opposition that could trigger renegotiation and, in the worst case, open the door to an eventual sunset in 2036 if no resolution is found.

Manufacturing across North America, and especially in the automotive sector, has a lot riding on the outcome. Automotive trade accounts for roughly 20–25% of total USMCA trade flows, making it the single largest sectorial user of the agreement. Since 2020, higher regional content requirements and labour‑value rules have already reshaped sourcing patterns for OEMs and tier suppliers, driving more production and component sourcing into Mexico, the U.S. and Canada.

Industry groups on all sides of the border are pushing for a stable, growth‑oriented review that preserves tariff‑free access and gives long‑term visibility to investors. At the same time, policymakers are signalling that the review will not be a formality. Areas likely to come under scrutiny include automotive rules of origin and tracing, enforcement of labour and environmental commitments, energy and state‑owned enterprise disputes, digital trade and data rules, and the role of Chinese investment and components in North American supply chains.

For U.S. manufacturers and importers, this means the next 12–18 months are a critical window to:

  • Verify that products truly qualify under current USMCA rules and identify any borderline cases.
  • Model how tighter regional content or new tracing requirements could change compliance status and cost.
  • Stress‑test footprint and sourcing decisions, particularly where there is high China content flowing via Mexico or Canada into the U.S.

Trans‑Pacific signs of an early peak

Eastbound trans‑Pacific trades are already showing signs of an early peak‑season, with container spot rates from Asia to the U.S. west and east coasts climbing sharply on the back of May general rate increases, as carriers tighten capacity and push through surcharges.

Recent data shows:

  • Spot rates from major South China ports to the U.S. west coast rising almost 100% on levels from only weeks earlier.
  • Asia–U.S. east coast spot rates climbing by 50–60% over a similar period, with some indices even higher.
  • Carriers rolling out peak season surcharges and emergency fuel surcharges ahead of the usual schedule, with higher amounts signalled for late June and 1 July.

Several dynamics are driving this early tightening:

  • Importers are front‑loading orders to get ahead of further cost increases later in the year, including potential tariff changes and bunker‑linked adjustments.
  • Vessel diversions around southern Africa to avoid Red Sea and Gulf of Aden risks, coupled with congestion at some Asian load ports, are absorbing capacity and disrupting schedules.
  • Capacity additions have lagged demand on key lanes, and carriers are using blank sailings and service adjustments to keep utilisation high.

We expect some rate relief later in the summer if additional capacity returns and front‑loaded volumes drop off, but the near‑term picture is one of elevated spot rates and tight space as peak‑season volumes converge with constrained supply.

Trucking and inland costs rise on fuel‑driven inflation

War‑driven fuel prices are pushing trucking and intermodal costs sharply higher, even before demand has fully recovered.

Since the escalation of conflict involving Iran, U.S. retail diesel prices have moved from just under USD 4 per gallon to around USD 5.60 per gallon on average, with some regions significantly higher. This jump has fed directly into trucking Producer Price Index (PPI) measures:

  • Truckload and LTL PPIs have risen markedly in recent months, reversing a multi‑year period of freight deflation;
  • Spot truckload rates on long‑haul lanes have climbed to their highest levels since 2022, with average per‑mile prices up more than 25% year‑on‑year in some benchmarks;
  • Higher fuel and capacity discipline are also starting to pull contract rates up, with increases spreading from truckload into LTL and intermodal.

It is worth noting that these increases are being driven largely by supply‑side constraints, reduced capacity, higher fuel costs and more disciplined carrier pricing, rather than by booming freight demand. For shippers, that means transport inflation can persist even if volumes remain only modestly above 2025 levels.

Metro’s CEO Grant Liddell and Managing Director Andrew Smith will be visiting U.S. offices and customers next week, to review operations and discuss these challenges on the ground, to help shape next‑step plans.

If you’d like to sense‑check your outlook for the second half of 2026 – from USMCA exposure and sourcing footprints to peak‑season capacity and inland cost pressures you can EMAIL Andrew directly or connect with the Metro Global USA team.

China flag and ship

China’s New 2026 Supply Chain Laws: What You Need to Know

China is rewiring the legal framework around its ports and supply chains and that matters for every UK shipper moving goods to, from or via China. 

Two new sets of rules in 2026 change who controls disputes, how far you can probe your supply chain, and how China may respond to Western sanctions and due‑diligence demands.

Below we set out what’s changing and what Metro’s customers should be thinking about.

New maritime law puts China’s courts in the driving seat

From 1 May 2026, China’s revised Maritime Code gives Chinese law a much stronger role in contracts of carriage linked to Chinese ports. Where the port of loading or discharge is in China, Chinese courts can apply Chapter IV of the Code to carriage contracts even if the bill of lading or sea freight agreement points to English law.

Law firm HFW has called this a “substantive change”, noting that “chapter four of the Chinese Maritime Code will apply to a contract of carriage regardless of whether or not another law has been incorporated or chosen by the parties”. In effect, if governing‑law and jurisdiction clauses are unclear, Chinese courts now have more room to assert jurisdiction over disputes involving cargo moving through their ports.

Trading agreements often choose English law and London arbitration, while the carrier’s bill of lading may point a different way. The question is whether, in a dispute, a Chinese court will treat the bill of lading as the main contract and apply Chinese law, despite what the trade agreement says.

Some industry experts see this as part of a broader strategic move, to encourage a switch from FOB to CIF terms so that Chinese exporters control freight, insurance and crucially litigation on home turf.

However, any FOB to CIF shift is commercial, not legal, and Incoterms are an international standard which means that FOB remains fully available for China–UK trade, where the buyer wants to control the main–carriage contract and freight costs.

So, China’s legal changes don’t cancel FOB, and UK buyers can still insist on FOB terms and book their own freight, provided the contracts and practical behaviour match that intention.

Supply chain security rules: due diligence under pressure

Alongside the maritime reforms, China has introduced its first comprehensive Regulations on Industrial and Supply Chain Security, effective 31 March 2026. These rules treat supply chains as part of national security rather than a purely commercial matter, bringing them under the oversight of economic, security and cyber authorities.

The most sensitive provision for Western companies is Article 13, which restricts “information gathering activities” related to industrial and supply chains where these are found to breach Chinese law. The language is broad and undefined, creating uncertainty about whether standard due‑diligence activities, which can include supplier questionnaires, ESG audits, human‑rights assessments or on‑site inspections, could fall within the scope.

This sits uneasily alongside emerging Western rules such as the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive and US forced‑labour legislation, which expect companies to map supply chains and scrutinise suppliers in detail. Legal commentators warn that “the new law creates a direct and unresolved conflict between Chinese law and Western due diligence obligations”, with companies potentially facing legal risk in China for work they are required to do under EU or US law.

The regulations also give authorities wide powers to respond to perceived threats to supply‑chain stability. Investigations can target foreign organisations and individuals where there is a “risk or threat” of harm, not just proven damage, and can lead to restrictions on trade, investment and cooperation in China, along with travel or work limits for individuals.

Counter‑measures against foreign sanctions

A companion set of rules – the Regulations on Countering Foreign Improper/Unjustifiable Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in force from early April – strengthens China’s ability to push back against foreign sanctions, export controls and data‑disclosure demands applied extraterritorially.

These sit alongside the Anti‑Foreign Sanctions Law, blocking rules and the “unreliable entities” regime, creating what one firm describes as an “integrated counter‑sanctions system”. Authorities can investigate and penalise organisations and individuals who implement or even “promote” foreign measures seen as discriminatory towards China, with tools ranging from import and export restrictions to asset seizures and visa bans.

This framework has emerged against a backdrop of heightened geopolitical tension, including Western tariffs and probes into China’s exports, secondary‑sanctions risks around Iran and disputes over strategic assets like the Panama Canal.

What shippers should do

None of this means that trading with China will suddenly stop or that every UK shipper is about to be investigated. But the risk environment has clearly changed, and it is worth taking some practical steps:

  • Check bills of lading, trade agreements and framework contracts to see where Chinese ports are involved, what law and jurisdiction are specified.
    Strengthen English‑law and arbitration provisions and clarify that higher‑tier agreements take precedence.
  • Talk to your insurers about how the revised Maritime Code might affect liability, claims handling and cover for China‑linked moves.
    Consider obtaining Chinese‑law input on key routes or contracts where your exposure is greatest.
  • Map which parts of your ESG and human‑rights due diligence involve Chinese suppliers or sites.
  • For higher‑risk work, such as auditing sensitive regions or investigations linked to sanctions, seek specialist advice on how to stay compliant with both Western obligations and Chinese restrictions.
  • Be mindful of public statements about “decoupling from China” or “boycotting” particular regions. These may be read as aligning with foreign measures and may increase regulatory attention in China.
  • Align messaging between compliance, procurement and communications so that necessary changes to your supply chain are framed around resilience, quality and legal compliance, not politics.

For Metro’s customers, the key takeaway is that China is now using law as an active tool of supply‑chain strategy. Understanding how these new rules work, and adjusting contracts, due‑diligence programmes and communication strategies accordingly, will help keep goods moving while managing a more complex risk landscape.

If you have questions or concerns about any of the developments outlined here EMAIL our Managing Director, Andrew Smith.

SMMT summit

EU urged to keep British auto supply chains within “Made in Europe” framework

The UK automotive industry is urging the European Union to preserve close manufacturing integration with Britain as Brussels advances new industrial policies designed to strengthen European supply chains and accelerate domestic electric vehicle production.

The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) has warned that proposed EU “Made in Europe” measures could unintentionally damage one of the world’s most integrated automotive manufacturing relationships if UK operations are excluded from future incentives and industrial support mechanisms.

The concerns centre on the EU’s proposed Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA), a key part of the bloc’s wider “Made in Europe” strategy aimed at strengthening European manufacturing, accelerating decarbonisation and improving competitiveness against the US and China.

UK and EU automotive manufacturing remains deeply interconnected

The SMMT recently met EU representatives in Brussels to discuss how the proposed legislation could affect cross-border automotive manufacturing and whether UK operations would remain eligible for support linked to the “Made in Europe” framework.

The industry body argues that the UK and EU automotive sectors remain fundamentally interdependent despite Brexit, with the EU exporting over €9bn worth of automotive components to UK manufacturers every year, making Britain the largest single export market globally for EU automotive parts.

These flows include battery systems, electric motors, traditional powertrain components, electronics, body panels and high-value engineered parts that move repeatedly between the UK and EU during the manufacturing cycle.

The wider UK–EU automotive relationship is now estimated to be worth around €80bn annually, while UK factories remain the EU’s largest export market for passenger vehicles, worth almost €40bn per year to European manufacturers.

SMMT chief executive Mike Hawes said, “Brexit put the resilience of our shared industry under enormous stress, but manufacturers have overcome those challenges to grow our trade in electrified vehicles alone to record levels.

The organisation argues that excluding UK operations from future “Made in Europe” incentives could weaken both UK and EU manufacturing competitiveness by disrupting deeply integrated supply chains that have evolved over decades.

Industrial policy becoming increasingly tied to supply chain geography

The proposed Industrial Accelerator Act forms part of a broader shift towards more interventionist industrial policy across major global economies.

The EU’s objective is to accelerate decarbonisation, strengthen domestic manufacturing capability and reduce strategic dependence on overseas supply chains, particularly in areas linked to electric vehicles, batteries and advanced technologies.

The concern for UK manufacturers is whether British suppliers, assembly operations and associated supply chains would qualify for the same incentives and support structures as EU-based competitors.

The SMMT has warned that excluding UK operations from the framework could create new friction across automotive supply chains at precisely the moment manufacturers are trying to accelerate investment into electrification, battery production and low-emission vehicle technology.

Global trade pressure adds further complexity

The debate also comes as the automotive industry adapts to increasingly fragmented global trade conditions.

Following the 2025 UK–US trade agreement, the United States became the UK’s largest export market for cars, with more than 101,000 UK-built vehicles shipped to the US during 2024, worth around £7.6bn. The agreement reduced US tariffs on British-built vehicles from 27.5% to 10% within a quota of 100,000 vehicles, providing important support for premium and luxury manufacturers serving the American market.

At the same time, European automotive manufacturers continue pushing for progress on EU–US trade negotiations amid concerns that tariff disputes and industrial competition could create further instability across international manufacturing networks.

Despite these global shifts, UK automotive leaders continue to stress that Europe remains operationally critical from a manufacturing, sourcing and logistics perspective.

Metro supports automotive manufacturers, suppliers and aftermarket businesses with integrated freight forwarding, customs support and multimodal logistics solutions designed for highly time-sensitive international supply chains. 

From UK–EU customs coordination and inbound production logistics to time-critical component distribution and international freight management, Metro helps automotive customers maintain continuity across complex manufacturing networks operating under changing regulatory and trade conditions.

EMAIL Managing Director, Andrew Smith, today to learn more.

Suez empty

Suez return remains fragile as carriers weigh faster transit against overcapacity

Although some shipping lines have begun selectively routing vessels back through the Suez Canal to reduce transit times and improve vessel utilisation, the industry remains far from a full-scale return to pre-crisis operating patterns.

Diversions around the Cape of Good Hope (COGH) have absorbed substantial global vessel capacity over the past two years by extending voyage times and reducing effective fleet availability. A broader return to Suez routing would rapidly reverse much of that dynamic, potentially releasing millions of TEU of effective capacity back into the market.

Routing via Suez shortens Asia–Europe voyages by more than 3,000 nautical miles compared with Cape routing, reducing transit times, improving vessel productivity and lowering fuel consumption, but the wider implications could be far more disruptive.

Faster transit times could rapidly shift supply and pricing dynamics

Industry estimates suggest that restoring normal Red Sea routings could release around 7% of effective fleet capacity back into the market. This would arrive at a time when container shipping is already facing heavy new-build vessel deliveries and relatively modest long-term demand growth.

The risk is that markets could move rapidly from relative tightness towards oversupply, placing renewed downward pressure on freight rates across major trades.

CMA CGM has increased the number of Suez Canal transits on two selected services, with shippers paying premium fees in exchange for faster transit times and reduced inventory delays.

Other carriers may be evaluating Red Sea routing strategies, although they remain cautious about large-scale network restructuring while regional security conditions remain unstable.

Importantly, any financial benefit from returning to Suez is still being offset by elevated war-risk insurance premiums and ongoing operational uncertainty linked to Houthi activity and wider instability across the Middle East.

Middle East instability continues to cloud long-term planning

Earlier expectations that container shipping could progressively return to normal Red Sea operations during 2026 have weakened significantly following renewed military escalation involving the US, Iran, Israel and regional proxy groups.

Several shipping lines that had previously explored limited Suez re-entry have since adopted a more cautious position, with some reversing earlier routing plans and returning services to COGH diversions.

At the same time, wider global trade patterns are also evolving in ways that partially offset oversupply concerns.

Chinese exporters are increasingly expanding into alternative markets including South America, Africa, the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East itself. These longer and more operationally complex trade flows consume additional vessel capacity and are helping absorb part of the substantial new tonnage entering the global fleet.

Even so, structural pressure continues to build beneath the surface.

Global trade growth is still expected to remain below the pace of new vessel deliveries scheduled between 2026 and 2028. Larger vessels are expected to feel the effects of oversupply first, particularly as cascading tonnage begins placing pressure on secondary and regional trades.

For shippers, the result is an increasingly uncertain operating environment where transit times, freight rates and network structures could change rapidly depending on how security conditions evolve across the Middle East.

While a full-scale return to Suez routing still appears unlikely in the near term, selective transits and gradual network adjustments are already beginning to reshape carrier strategies, pricing behaviour and capacity planning across major east-west trades.

Metro is working closely with customers to assess Suez and Cape of Good Hope routing trade-offs, comparing carrier strategies and identifying the ocean freight solutions most aligned to their supply chain priorities, inventory requirements and risk tolerance.

EMAIL Metro Managing Director Andrew Smith to learn how differing Suez and Cape routing strategies could affect your supply chain, and how Metro helps shippers balance transit times, security risk, insurance exposure, cost volatility and schedule reliability.